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Abstract:It is generally argued that Turkey seems to be different geographically, culturally, 
politically and economically from the EU. Transformation of Turkey towards the Europe in 
these terms requires overcoming a broad range of the obstacles and maintaining reforms 
process without losing public support. This situation exposes the importance of internal 
dynamics in the accession process in terms of carrying out necessary reforms for the full 
membership. However, Turkey recently experienced an unprecedented reform process as a 
result of the synergy between external and internal factors, particularly the EU. This research 
tries to empirically examine the youth support for the EU-led reform process by utilizing a 
novel data set obtained from the questionnaire carried out in 26 different universities about 
2000 students, during November and December 2009, in Turkey. The empirical findings show 
that partisanship, both political and religious attachments and national identity are the 
important factors which explain differences of individual support for the EU-led reform 
process for democratization in Turkey. 
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Introduction 
 
The integration of Turkey with the EU constitutes an interesting case for several reasons. It is generally 
argued that Turkey seems to be different geographically, culturally, politically and economically from the EU. 
Transformation of Turkey towards the Europe in these terms requires overcoming a broad range of the obstacles, 
changes and maintaining reforms process without losing public support. In other words, the Turkish 
governments, on the one hand, try to fulfill the EU accession conditionality and, on the other hand, they face 
with an increasing opposition from the status quo or various segment of the society. This dichotomy exposes the 
importance of internal dynamics in the accession process in terms of carrying out necessary reforms for the full 
membership.  
However, Turkey recently experienced a rapid transformation as a result of the synergy between 
external and internal factors. The EU particularly has played an anchor role in this period. Especially, Turkey has 
carried out important political reforms to democratize the political structure after acceptance of an official 
candidate at the Helsinki summit in 1999.  In addition, as the newly elected government in 2002 forced 
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aggressively for a date for the start of membership negotiations, it demonstrated an unprecedented performance 
in both the economic and political realms. 
However, it is argued that the dynamism of the reform was replaced by the stagnation in the recent 
years, starting roughly after Turkey secured the launch of the accession process in 2005. Confronted with the 
opposition and demands of increasingly irritating nationalist voices in the country, as well as adverse 
international conditions, the ruling AK Party lost the momentum of its reformist path, also leading to a stalemate 
in Turkish-EU relations. As far as the dynamics of reform process is concerned, one of the important questions is 
whether there was/has been a sufficient motivation for both reforms in the past and potential transformation in 
future within the Turkish public and civil society. Although there is a limited literature on why Turkish decision 
makers are pursuing integration with the Europe (McLaren and Müftüler-Baç, 2003) and why the Turkish 
citizens would vote for Turkey‘s accession to the EU in a possible membership referendum (Çarkoğlu, 2003; 
Kentmen, 2008), existing research on the EU-Turkey interactions lacks empirical analyses of whether and to 
what extent Turkish people support to the reform process in Turkey. In order to sustain the reforms, the public 
support is well needed for further reforms in the future in Turkey. 
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to investigate the determinants of individual support for the EU-led reforms 
on democratization in Turkey. In particular, this research tries to empirically examine the youth support for the 
EU-led reform process by utilizing a novel data set obtained from the questionnaire carried out in 26 different 
universities about 2000 students, during November and December 2009, in Turkey. 
 
The EU-led Reform Process in Turkey 
 
The ruling elite have long seen the economic and political integration into Europe a cherished goal for 
Turkey. However, Turkey‘s integration process reveals unprecedented challenges and opportunities for both 
sides in terms of economic and political gains. In particular, Turkey would differentiate from the previous 
enlargements in the context of its population, size, geographical location, economic, security and military 
potential, as well as cultural and religious characteristics. These features make Turkey special and interesting not 
only for the EU but also for researchers in many fields in the social sciences. This subject is still undoubtedly 
one of the Turkey‘s most important foreign policy problems and also an extremely powerful domestic issue as 
well. 
Turkey has been a member in many organizations in the Western Europe since the post war period (the 
Council of Europe in 1949, the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms in 1954, the NATO in 1952, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975). Turkey 
was officially recognized as a candidate for the European Union in Helsinki in 1999, given a date for the 
beginning of the accession negotiations in December 2004 at which this meeting decided to start the negotiations 
in October 2005. The negotiations for full membership came four decades after the Ankara Agreement signed 
between Turkey and the EEC in 1963. In addition, Turkey signed a Customs Union Agreement with the EU in 
1995. This brief history states that Turkey qualifies as the longest standing associate partner of the EU. 
Although the Ankara Agreement was one of the critical turning in Turkey‘s relations with Europe in 
1963, this relationship has not followed a smooth process. In particular, this relationship was interrupted by the 
intervention of the military into the politics in 1980. The EU proved to be an extremely active and vocal source 
of criticism of the military regime at a time when the US was relatively passive and indifferent actor for strategic 
and geopolitical objectives (ÖniĢ, 1999b:128). The EU‘s constant pressure clearly was very crucial and 
encouraged Turkey‘s early transition to democracy in 1983 and the relations were finally normalized in 1986.  
Turkey surprisingly made an application for membership in 1987 and was rejected mostly on economic 
grounds. The Commission‘s advisory report at that time makes a very short reference to the poor democracy in 
Turkey. However gross violations of human rights in Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s overshadowed the 
normalized relations. The European Parliament played a leading role to draw the attention of the European states 
and public to the situation of minorities in Turkey, large limitations over political and civil rights, the fate of 
political prisoners, disappearances and anonymous killings (Dağı, 2001). In particular, the European Parliament 
declared in 1995, it would vote against the custom union on the grounds of gross human rights in Turkey and this 
caused the Turkish government to make certain democratic reforms immediately. However, developments after 
the agreement for the Customs Union with the EU showed that this agreement per se failed to provide an 
appropriate mix of conditions and incentives to induce a major transformation in domestic politics and economy 
in Turkey (ÖniĢ, 2003:9). 
The declaration of the Copenhagen criteria in 1993 opened a new era both in the EU history of 
enlargement and in Turkey. These criteria indicated that the membership was not only an issue of economic or 
political integration, but also an integration of democratic values and norms that are usually immaterial and 
intangible. Due to the terrorist movement in the southern Turkey, security was prioritized and the Turkish 
government was not ready for such a change and did not prepare a serious plan for democratization which was 
constantly postponed (Erdogan, 2006). In addition, Turkey‘s relations with the EU had its worst moment in 1997 
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at the Luxemburg summit which did not give Turkey as a candidacy status for full membership. This decision 
created a reaction in the Turkish side which decided to reject all conditions and not to discuss any issue with the 
EU. 
Turkey had to wait until the acceptance of an official candidate in 1999 at the Helsinki summit with the 
same conditions as the other candidates. This candidacy status represented a fundamental turning point in 
Turkey-EU relations and triggered the democratization in Turkey. Although significant constitutional and legal 
reforms have been adopted under the influence of the globalization of democratic norms and the encouraging 
effect of the prospect of the EU membership to strengthen and deepen the democratic values in Turkey ever 
since 1983, they are not sufficient to complete the transformation of its political system into a liberal or 
consolidated democracy. 
In particular, the 1995, 1999, 2001 and 2004 reforms are more important in terms of democratization 
and liberalization and modified the authoritarian nature of the 1982 constitution (Yazıcı, 2004; Özbudun, 2007). 
The authoritarian legacy was eliminated not only by these constitutional reforms, but also by several legal 
reforms, called as ‗harmonization packages‘, which adopted between February 2002 and August 2003. These 
packages enlarged the scope of certain fundamental rights and liberties such as the freedom of thought, freedom 
of expression, freedom of press, freedom of association (Yazıcı, 2004:99). In addition, role of the military over 
the politics substantially reduced by amending the structure of the National Security Council (NSC) which is a 
decision-making in the course of last two decades. Clearly, a change of this magnitude would have been 
impossible in the absence of a powerful and highly institutionalized EU anchor in the direction of full 
membership (ÖniĢ, 2003:13). 
It is generally argued that the dynamism of this first democratization period was replaced by the 
stagnation after Turkey secured the launch of the accession process in 2005. Confronted with the opposition and 
demands of increasingly irritating nationalist voices in the country, as well as adverse international conditions, 
the ruling AK Party lost the momentum of its reformist path, also leading to a stalemate in Turkish-EU relations. 
In particular, nature of the negotiation as being ‗open-ended‘, uncertainty about the future of the negotiations, 
existence of explicit opposition of some member states (i.e. France, Austria and to some extent Germany), 
internal opposition from the political parties, hard line Republicans and Nationalists and the government‘s 
reform fatigue seems to slow down the reform process. 
At this point, it is very important who has supported /supports the EU-led reform process in Turkey, 
since it is very difficult to continue this process without the internal support.  
 
Source of Public Support for the EU-led Reform Process 
 
 There is a large literature to examine the differences among the public on the support for the EU 
integration. Several previous studies have identified systematic differences in individual-level support for 
integration related to partisanship (Inglehart, Rabier and Reif, 1991; Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren, 1994; 
Franklin, Marsh, Wlezien, 1994; Franklin, Van der Eijk, and Marsh, 1995; Cichowski, 2000, Tverdova and 
Anderson, 2004), age, gender (Carey, 2002), income (Anderson and Reichert, 1996; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; 
Gabel, 1998; Gabel and Whitten, 1997), occupation (McLaren, 2004; Venables, 2003; Jolly and Brinegar, 2003; 
Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Kentmen, 2008), cognitive skills (Inglehart, 1970a; Inglehart, Rabier and Reif, 1991; 
Janssen, 1991), political values (Inglehart, 1970b, 1990; Inglehart, Rabier and Reif, 1991; Anderson and 
Reichert, 1996), support for government (Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren, 1994; Franklin, Marsh, Wlezien, 1994; 
Tanasoiu and Colonescu, 2008), identity (Smith, 1992; Carey, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Kentmen, 2008) 
and religious attachment (Nelsen et al., 2001; Çarkoğlu, 2003; Nelsen and Guth, 2003, Kentmen, 2008) 
Based on this vast literature, this paper tries to empirically investigate the support for the EU-led reform 
process in terms of partisanship and political self-description (ideology), religious attachment and national 
identity in Turkey. 
 
Partisanship and Political Attachment 
 
 With the establishment of the Republic in 1923, the founders of the State clearly stated declared that 
their objectives were to catch up with and become part of ―contemporary civilization‖ which constituted the 
fundamentals of the Turkish modernization.  The Turkish modernization effort in nature was elite and state 
driven and these bureaucratic elite controlled the course for the development (Mehmet, 1983:57; ÖniĢ, 1999; 
Barkey, 2000:88-90). The main characteristic of the Turkish modernization as argued by Black (1967) is that  
socio-economic developments were formed by this political elite whom play a central role in almost all affairs in 
a manner of traditional strong state which has acting capacity almost completely independent from civil society 
(Heper, 1985). Based on this background, a close relationship with the West and especially with the European 
integration has always been one of the important foreign policy objectives for Turkey. With the full membership 
perspective for Turkey in the early 2000, Turkey has experienced an increasing reform process and the EU has 
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played as an important external anchor in Turkey. The public support for the reform is very essential to push the 
democratization further. 
 Inglehart, Rabier and Reif (1991:152) put it that the EU represents a vehicle for social, political, and 
economic reforms. However, every segment of the public may not be affected equally and in the same way by 
these reforms and therefore while the winners in this process may support the reforms, the losers may oppose the 
new reforms. In a democratic society, the power of the public is very important and, citizens may halt the reform 
process by withdrawing their support. 
 Following the literature on the link between partisanship, political attachment and support for the EU 
integration (Inglehart, Rabier and Reif, 1991; Franklin, Marsh, and McLaren, 1994; Franklin, Marsh, Wlezien, 
1994; Franklin, Van der Eijk, and Marsh, 1995; Cichowski, 2000, Tverdova and Anderson, 2004), this paper 
proposes that citizens adopt attitudes toward the reform process that reflect the position of the party they support. 
In other words, the party shapes its supporters' attitudes toward reform independent of their personal 
characteristics (e.g., occupation, income, and values) that might influence both their choice of party and support 
for integration. In addition, when the public make up their decision on something that there is not enough 
knowledge about it, they look at the behavior of the political figures (leaders) or political institutions (parties) 
they support or vote for. 
 In addition, as Inglehart (1970b, 1990) posited that support for European integration, and therefore for 
the reform process in Turkey, is associated with value orientations regarding economic and political issues 
(Gabel 1998). According to the theory, citizens' political behaviors are structured by the socioeconomic 
conditions surrounding their formative, or preadult, years. These conditions are expected to shape certain values 
and attitudes that tend to persist over an adult's lifetime. To this end, political attachment of citizens in terms of 
self-description (social democrat, Turkish nationalist, democrat, Islamist, nationalist (ulusalcı) and Atatürkist 
(Atatürkçü) etc.) may explain variation in individual attitudes toward the reform process.  
 In Turkey, the harmonization packages changed the military backed 1982 Constitution in the 2000s are 
more associated with the human rights, freedom of expression, democratic standards. It can be argued that these 
reforms are directly related with not only the physical security (materialist value) but also intellectual fulfillment 
and self-actualization (post-materialistic value). Consequently, one might expect that political attachment with 
the materialist and post-materialist values in terms of political self-description may explain the variation in 
individual attitudes towards the reform process. In other words, those who support a less nationalistic and a more 
egalitarian society would be more likely to be supportive for the reform process. Along the conventional left-
right ideological divide those who consider themselves to be leftists are significantly more inclined to support 
the EU-led reforms. Specifically, individuals identifying with conservative parties are found to be more 
supportive of membership than left-oriented respondents (Shepherd 1975; Inglehart, Rabier & Reif 1991) 
 As far as the attitudes of the main political parties in Turkey toward the EU are concerned, the 
Republican People Party (RPP) as a founder of the Republic is generally accepted to support the EU membership 
on the basis of the legacy of Kemalism, westernization, from the beginning (Ahmad, 1993; Özdemir, 2008). The 
RPP as an opposition party was usually positive in the reform process in 2000s and support the EU 
Harmonization Packages. Recently, the RPP has been very critical to go further reform on democratization in 
terms of solution for the Kurdish issue. Therefore the reluctance of the RPP is characterized to be a soft euro-
skepticism and to resist to reform process (Verney, 2007). ÖniĢ (2007) argues that a conservative, religious 
based party may play structurally a limited role in promoting Europeanization agenda and highlights the need of 
a major European-style social democratic party which promotes domestically democratization and supports 
Turkey‘s bid for full membership externally through the European social democrat parties. 
 The National Action Party (NAP) as a Turkish nationalist party is generally against the reform process, 
although first two important harmonization packages passed the Parliament during a coalition government 
including itself. The NAP is against the democratization on the grounds that the reform process may encourage 
the separatist feelings and actions in the southeast of Turkey and would split the country in two separate entities.  
 The Justice and Development Party (JDP) coming from a pro-Islamic political tradition, namely the 
National Outlook Movement (Milli GörüĢ Hareketi) (National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi) in the late 
1960s, National Salvation Party in the 1970s, Welfare Party (WP) (Refah Partisi) from the early 1980s to 1997, 
Virtue Party (VP) (Fazilet Partisi) from 1997 to 199 and currently Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi)), established, 
after the closure of the Virtue Party, by ―the reformers‖ of this party in 2002 (Dağı, 2005; Toprak, 2005) and has 
been ruling the country for the last 8 years (2002-?). The JDP puts forward pro-western external relations in 
economic and political terms, aimed at being a full member of the EU at the end and has been very enthusiastic 
for the democratization in Turkey. The JDP‘s impressive politics of reform paved the way to EU accession 
negotiations and furthered the democratization of Turkey (Karakas, 2007). In particular, after the Copenhagen 
Summit in 2002 stated that if Turkey meets the Copenhagen Political Criteria until the EU Summit in December 
2004, the accession negotiations will start ―without delay‖. Therefore, the JDP started a wave of reform period 
by amending the constitution and other legal documents to meet the Copenhagen Political Criteria. 
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 The ruling JDP‘s enthusiastic efforts for Turkey‘s EU membership, in contrast to the hesitations of the 
Kemalists, is indicative of the changing positions of political forces in Turkish politics. As the Kemalists seemed 
to have abandoned the idea and ideal of westernization, the Islamists have moved towards advocating further 
westernization, which entails deeper democracy, broader human rights, closer integration with the EU and a 
lesser (Kemalist) state (Dağı, 2005). Verney (2007) argues that the moderate Islamists of the JDP have become 
the most vigorous elements of the globalizing pro-reform coalition, being transformed in the process into self-
processed ‗Muslim democrats‘.  
 With the entrance of the JDP to the political arena, the Turkish politics cannot be evaluated in the 
traditional left-right axis. While the JDP pushes for reform, the RPP resists to it. Normally it is expected that 
reluctance of the RPP as agent for westernization for a long time and central left for asking further 
democratization is not well understood in Turkey. Therefore, in order to emphasize the complexity in the 
political arena, ÖniĢ (2007) states that the political struggle currently goes on between ‗conservative globalists‘, 
promoting the domestic reform process, and ‗defensive nationalists‘, resisting it. Many of the secular elites 
which have traditionally supported Westernization, including the military, are uncomfortable with the political 
reforms promoted through EU conditionality. 
 There is also a shift on the attitudes of the Felicity Party (FP) toward the EU. In the past, Coming from 
the National Outlook Movement tradition, the parties (the WP and the VP) before the FP was against the EU and 
openly declared this discourse in the 1980s and 1990s. The 28 February Process seems to be an important 
element and has resulted in a change in the attitudes of the party towards the EU (Taniyici, 2003). Since then the 
FP emphasizes the democratic principles and human rights and seems to be in favor of the EU membership. It is 
expected that the supporters of the FP would approve the EU-led reform process.  
 On the other hand, the Democratic Society Party (DSP) as a Kurdish nationalist party (banned by the 
constitutional court and re-structured under the Peace and Democracy Party recently) pushed for further reform 
in terms of minority rights, cultural right, asking the military to stop the military actions against the Kurdish 
separatist in the southeast of Turkey. The DSP was supportive in the Parliament in these harmonization 
packages. 
 Based upon these ideological backgrounds and political practices, one might argue that the central left 
(RPP) and central right (JDP) parties, in addition to the pro-Kurdish one (DSP), favor for reform which proposes 
further democratization in the country. On the other hand, the Turkish nationalist party (NAP) is against for the 
reform process. Following this discussion, it is claimed that: 
 H1: The supporters of the mainstream political parties (central-left and central-right) are more likely to 
be in favor of the EU-led reforms. 
H2: The supporters of the Kurdish nationalist party are more likely to be in favor of the EU-led reforms. 
H3: The supporters of the Turkish nationalist party are more likely to be skeptical about the EU-led 
reforms. 
H4: Type of political attachment (ideological self-description) may explain the variation in individual 
attitudes towards the reform process. 
 
Religious Attachment 
 
Recently, there is a growing literature whether social norms and religious beliefs are predictors of 
individual opinion about European integration. In order to evaluate complex and relatively new social issues, 
individual attachment to a religion might be very important. In particular, Seul (1999) argues that religious 
beliefs may have implications for evaluating political and social life and therefore may propose specific rules to 
provide sense stability for individuals in a changing world. New and relatively unknown developments in the 
social, economic and political areas may bring about insecurity and ambiguity for the future and may result in 
resistance for these new formations. The topic is covered in the researches whether a Protestant or a Catholic 
behaves differently towards the European integration (Hagevi, 2002; Nelsen and Guth, 2003; Nelsen et al., 2001; 
Vollaard, 2006). In addition, this literature emphasizes that the degree of attachment to religious norms and 
values might be matter. In particular, the effect of religion on the behaviors may change with the religiosity of 
the individual (Nelsen et al., 2001; Nelsen and Guth, 2003, Kentmen, 2008) 
However empirical research on how Islamic beliefs shape attitudes toward the EU is very limited 
(Çarkoğlu, 2003; Kentmen, 2008). A popular perception is that Islamist fundamentalists disapprove of Western 
values and the West‘s cultural, political and economic hegemony. This link between Islam and the West has long 
been one of the hotly debated issues on two grounds (Kentmen, 2008). First one is about a popular perception on 
whether Islam is anti-western, following the attacks of 11 September 2001 (Dagi, 2005). If this argument is 
valid, alienation of Muslim from Europe would lead Muslim individuals with strong religious beliefs to be less 
supportive for the EU. In this case, Muslims are more likely to be reluctant for supporting main principles of the 
western ideals. Second one is whether the religiosity plays any role in supporting the Western ideas. To what 
extent, greater attachment to Islamic norms and values may influence the individual approaches toward the West. 
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In order to truly evaluate Turkish Islamic attitudes towards the West, one should go back to the period 
of Ottoman Empire. Especially when the Empire lagged behind the West in terms of political and economic 
developments and technological achievements, some Islamic elites mainly directed their criticism to the West 
and did not look for the roots of the collapse in the Empire. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, many 
Islamists continued to criticize Western influences because they believed that the secular reforms achieved by 
the Turkish Republic had originated in the West and therefore did not have any place in Islamic teaching 
(Kentmen, 2008).  
The Islamic elite in the 1970s and the 1980s generally saw the European Community as a Christian 
Club, further secularism, and new form of westernization and opposed to Turkey‘s attempt to join in it (Canefe 
and Bora, 2003). This perception radically changed after indirect military intervention into the politics in 1997, 
known as ―the 28 February Process‖. This intervention was the result of accepting the political Islam as a threat 
to the Republic and tried to control ―all forms of Islamist expression in the public sphere‖ (Dağı, 2004:138). This 
move from the secular forces of the Republic increased the fear among the Islamic elite who evaluate that a more 
radical and oppressive form of implementation of secularism is unbearable. As a result, many Islamists have 
become supporters of ‗Western ideals‘ and loud advocates of Western values such as liberalism, democracy, 
freedom of thought and freedom of religion in recent years as a response to state control over religious 
expression in Turkey (Dağı, 2004). Canefe and Uğur (2004) specifically revealed that compared with the past, 
the state elite had become relatively cautious about accession, whereas antiestablishment groups, such as 
Islamists and ethnic minorities, had become more supportive in Turkey. 
Given this very brief historical background, it seems plausible to expect many Muslim individuals in 
Turkey at the present time to have a positive view of the EU, which is seen as promoting and guaranteeing 
liberal rights (Kentmen, 2008). Following this discussion, it is claimed that: 
H5: Level of attachment to religion may explain the variation in individual attitudes towards the EU-led 
reforms. 
H6: Level of attachment to Islam may explain the variation in individual attitudes towards the EU-led 
reforms. 
 
National Identity 
 
Recently there is a growing literature which points to national identity as an important explanation of 
(lack of) support for European integration (Carey 2002, Marks and Hooghe 2003, Hooghe and Marks 2004, 
Netjes and Edwards 2004). The discussion on identity draws on psychology of group membership to consider 
how national identity affects support for European integration (De Vries and van Kersbergen, 2007). Urry (2000) 
argues that individuals rely on their national identity to frame their needs and to differentiate themselves from 
others. The literature developed by Smith (1992), Shore (1993), Christin and Trechsel (2002) and Hooghe and 
Marks (2005) emphasizes that individuals who have strong attachments to their national identity might perceive 
the integration of member states as a threat causing to lose their national identity, because it dissolves the 
differences among the national communities. Carey (2002:393) highlights that individuals may prefer the 
―protection of the in-group (the nation), and the group identity at stake, from the out-group (the EU)‖. 
However Hooghe and Marks (2004) points to the multi-layered and flexible nature of social identity and 
suggest that some individual can prefer two identities (national and European identities) simultaneously. This 
preference imply that these individuals do not see their national identity as their only reference point and are 
happy with weakening of national identity in the process of the unification (Kentmen, 2008). At this point, 
Marks and Hooghe (2003) make an important classification which argues that one needs to distinguish between 
several types of national identity, by evaluating the extent to which national identity is exclusive or inclusive. 
Individuals who consider their national identity as exclusive will see supranational governance as a threat, 
whereas those with multiple identities will be favorably disposed to governance beyond the nation-state 
(Kentmen, 2008).  
As far as empirical research on this issue is concerned, the link between national identity and support 
for the European integration is ambiguous. On the one hand, Marks (1999) and Haesly (2001) argue that national 
identity is consistent with European identity and support for European integration and, on the other hand, Carey 
(2002) and Ketmen (2008) reveal that attachment to national identity have a significant negative impact on 
support for European integration. In other words, the literature states that individuals who attach themselves 
more closely with their nation than with the EU to be less supportive of European unification (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2004).Based on the discussion above, one might argue that there is a direct link between national identity 
and support for the EU-led reforms. As far as the political discussion recently taking place in Turkey on further 
democratization is concerned, especially the Turkish nationalist considers that democratization in the way to the 
EU membership and attempts to build the unity and peace in the country may result in breaking away of Turkey. 
Following this discussion, it is claimed that: 
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H7: Level of attachment to national identity may explain the variation in individual attitudes towards 
the EU-led reforms. 
 
Empirical Analysis  
 
Data 
 
In order to test the hypotheses about the micro-level determinants of support for the EU, a novel data 
set, collected through the questionnaires which were applied to 2047 university youths in 26 universities in 
November and December 2009 throughout Turkey, is utilized. Distribution of the universities in 7 regions is as 
follows: Ġstanbul, Uludağ (Bursa), Kocaeli and Beykent Universities in the Marmara Region; Dokuz Eylül 
University (Ġzmir), Ġzmir Economics and Ege Universities in the Agean Region; Akdeniz Bölgesinden Akdeniz 
(Antalya), Çukurova (Adana) and KahramanmaraĢ Sütçü Ġmam Universities in the Mediteranean Region; Selçuk 
(Konya), Ankara, Erciyes (Akyseri) and Afyon Kocatepe Universities in the Central Anatolia Region; Zonguldak 
Karaelmas, Ondokuz Mayıs (Samsun), GaziosmanpaĢa (Tokat) ve Karadeniz Teknik Universities in the Black 
Sea Region; Kafkas (Kars), Ġnönü (Malatya), Atatürk (Erzurum) and Van Yüzüncü Yıl Universities in the East 
Anatolia Region and Dicle (Diyarbakır), Fırat (Elazığ), Gaziantep and Harran (ġanlıurfa) Universities in the 
South East Anatolia Region. Distribution of the student in each university is presented in the Appendix A. 
Initially, the base line date for the registered student in each university is obtained from the Educational 
Statistics of the Higher Educational Council of Turkey. The number of target student for the questionnaire in 
each university is determined by weighing the registered students in each university. During the application of 
the questionnaire to target students, the number of students in each department in each faculty in each university 
and gender are carefully designed to get random information to represent the full sample, the university youths. 
The distribution of the sample in terms of gender is 52,6 percent man and %47,4 percent female. 
The logistic regression is employed in the empirical analysis. The use logistic regression is commonly 
utilized statistical tool for the analysis which uses the binary dependent variable (approval or disapproval of the 
EU-led reforms in Turkey). Logistic regression results provide probabilities that an individual will support for 
the EU-led reforms, given a certain combination of values on the independent variables. It proves to be a useful 
tool as it allows us to differentiate between groups of respondents and compare the likelihoods that they will 
support for the EU-led reforms. 
 
Operationalization of Variables 
 
Support for the EU-led reforms, the dependent variable is operationalized using the question:  
―The reforms carried out in the framework of the EU membership in Turkey is necessary‖ 
The answer for this question is constructed in terms of a 5-item Likert- Scale (1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 
3= undecided, 4== agree and 5= strongly agree). The final distribution of the dependent variable is 51,2 percent 
in favor (agree plus strongly agree) and 25,4 percent opposed (strongly disagree plus disagree) or 23,4 percent 
undecided as presented in Table 1. It is very interesting that about 23 percent of the student did not provide any 
information and stated as ―undecided‖. 
 
 ―The reforms carried out in the framework of the EU membership in Turkey is necessary” 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid strongly disagree 177 8,6 9,0 9,0 
disagree 324 15,8 16,4 25,4 
undecided 462 22,6 23,4 48,8 
agree 680 33,2 34,4 83,2 
strongly agree 332 16,2 16,8 100,0 
Total 1975 96,5 100,0  
Missing System 72 3,5   
Total 2047 100,0   
Table 1: Distribution of the Answers for the Necessity of Reforms 
 
For the purposes of this study, support for the EU-led reforms is operationalized as a binary variable, 
coded 1 when the respondent (agree plus strongly agree) believes in necessity of the reforms, and 0 when the 
respondent (strongly disagree plus disagree plus undecided) do not support the reforms or when s/he is 
undecided. This sort of coding has significant methodological advantages, in terms of larger sample size and 
more equal distribution, compared to a ‗clean‘ dichotomy of ‗in favor‘ and ‗against‘ answers (Ehin, 2001). Also, 
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the theoretically interesting question is not what distinguishes firm supporters of reforms from firm opponents 
but what distinguishes firm supporters from everybody else (Ehin, 2001:43).  
The proposed hypotheses require the introduction of five concepts that need to be operationalized: 
Partisanship, political attachment (ideological self-description), religious attachment, Islamic attachment, 
national identity. 
Partisanship, the first set of the independent variable is operationalized using the question: 
―If there is a general election tomorrow, which party would vote for?‖ 
The answer for this question constitutes of the mainstream political parties in Turkey. In addition, the 
respondent is free to write down any other party which is not in the answer. The JDP, the RPP, the NAP, the FP 
and the DSP denotes the Justice and Development Party, the Republican People Party, National Action Party, 
Felicity Party and Democratic Society Party (recently banned by the Constitutional Court and re-established 
currently under the Peace and Democracy Party). Distribution of possible vote for the political parties is 
presented in Table 2. The other parties are DP, Democrat Party; DLP, Democratic Left Party; GUP, Great Unity 
Party. These small parties are not included in the analysis. As can be seen from Table 2, the biggest party student 
would vote for is ―none of the established party‖. This information is very interesting and implies that the 
university youths are not happy with the existing parties.  
Five dummy variables for mainstream political parties (JDP, RPP, NAP, FP, DSP) are created. This 
dummy is obtained in the binary form, coded 1 when the respondent would vote one of the political parties and 0 
when the respondent would vote for the other parties or when s/he is undecided. In addition, one more dummy as 
―None‖ created as the same methodology to represent the biggest group who would not vote for ―none of the 
existing parties‖. 
 
If there is a general election tomorrow, which party would vote for? 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid JDP 420 20,5 21,4 21,4 
RPP 425 20,8 21,6 43,0 
NAP 256 12,5 13,0 56,0 
FP 36 1,8 1,8 57,8 
DP 18 ,9 ,9 58,7 
DLP 22 1,1 1,1 59,9 
DSP 92 4,5 4,7 64,5 
GUP 47 2,3 2,4 66,9 
Other 99 4,8 5,0 72,0 
None 524 25,6 26,7 98,6 
Not Classified   1,4 100,0 
Total 1966 96,0 100,0  
Missing System 81 4,0   
Total 2047 100,0   
Table 2: Distribution of Possible Vote for the Political Parties 
 
 Political attachment (ideological self-description), this independent variable is operationalized using 
the question: 
―Which of the following identities commonly used in Turkey describes you best?‖ 
The answer for this question includes ―Turkish Nationalist, Atatürkist, Kemalist, Nationalist (Ulusalcı), 
Feminist, Social Democrat, Socialist/Marxist, Islamist, Other (please state:…..)‖. For the purpose of this study, 
five dummies for each mainstream self-description (Atatürkist, 27,9 percent; Turkish nationalist, 21,7 percent; 
Social democrat, 14,3 percent; nationalist (ulusalcı), 9,9 percent; Islamist, 7,8) is created in a binary form as 
coded 1 if the respondent describes himself as one of the above identities, and 0 if the respondent describes 
himself as the others of the above identities. 
 Religious attachment, this independent variable is operationalized using the question: 
 ―How would you define yourself in terms of your approach towards religion?‖ 
There is a ten-item scale in the questionnaire, and the answers 1 to 10 means that zero if the respondent is 
disinterested in religion in extreme case (atheist) and 10 if the respondent is interested in religion in the other 
extreme case (radical). Distribution of the students‘ answers is presented in Table 3. 
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How would you define yourself in terms of your approach towards religion? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1,00 57 2,8 2,9 2,9 
2,00 51 2,5 2,6 5,4 
3,00 94 4,6 4,7 10,1 
4,00 72 3,5 3,6 13,7 
5,00 320 15,6 16,0 29,7 
6,00 291 14,2 14,6 44,3 
7,00 366 17,9 18,3 62,6 
8,00 458 22,4 22,9 85,5 
9,00 175 8,5 8,8 94,2 
10,00 116 5,7 5,8 100,0 
Total 2000 97,7 100,0  
Missing System 47 2,3   
Total 2047 100,0   
Table 3: Approaches of Students towards Religion 
 
 As seen in Table 3, the answers are unevenly distributed and focus on 5-8 range. Two binary variables 
are created from these answers. First one is ―Moderately Religious‖, accounted for 48,9 percent, coded 1 if the 
respondent describes himself (herself) as 5-7, and 0 if the respondent describes himself (herself) as others. 
Second one is ―Religious‖, accounted for 22,9 percent, coded 1 if the respondent describes himself (herself) as 8, 
and 0 if the respondent describes himself (herself) as others. 
Islamic attachment, this variable is operationalized using the question: 
 ―How would you describe yourself in terms of adherence to Islamic values?‖ 
 There is a ten-item scale in the questionnaire, and the answers 1 to 10 means that zero if the respondent 
does not adhere to Islamic values at all and 10 if the respondent completely adheres to Islamic values. 
Distribution of the students‘ answers is presented in Table 4. 
 
How would you describe yourself in terms of adherence to Islamic values? 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid 1,00 54 2,6 2,7 2,7 
2,00 66 3,2 3,3 6,0 
3,00 93 4,5 4,6 10,6 
4,00 79 3,9 3,9 14,6 
5,00 270 13,2 13,5 28,1 
6,00 257 12,6 12,8 40,9 
7,00 345 16,9 17,2 58,2 
8,00 442 21,6 22,1 80,3 
9,00 212 10,4 10,6 90,9 
10,00 183 8,9 9,1 100,0 
Total 2001 97,8 100,0  
Missing System 46 2,2   
Total 2047 100,0   
Table 4: Adherence of Students to Islamic values 
 
 National identity, this independent variable is operationalized using the question: 
 ―How would you feel/define yourself whether you are European or not?‖ 
 The answer for this question is ―European, European and Turkish, Turkish and European, Turkish, 
European and Other (please write down:…..), Other (please write down:…..) and European, Other (please write 
down:…….)‖. Distribution of the answers is presented in Table 5.  
 As can be seen from Table 4, 56,6 percent of the students feel themselves as ―Turkish‖, 21,2 percent of 
them feel as ―Turkish and European‖ and 4,3 percent feels as ―European and Turkish‖ and 1,3 percent feel as 
―Kurdish‖. As far as ―European and Other‖, ―Other and European‖ and ―Other‖ together account for 12,1 
percent which might also include some Kurdish, albeit uncertain. Four binary dummies are structured from this 
information. ―European‖ coded 1 if the respondent feels himself (herself) as European and 0 if the respondent 
feels himself (herself) as the other identities.  ―European and Turkish‖ coded 1 if the respondent feels himself 
(herself) as European and Turkish (simultaneously) and 0 if the respondent feels himself (herself) as the other 
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identities. ―Turkish and European‖ coded 1 if the respondent feels himself (herself) as Turkish and European 
(simultaneously) and 0 if the respondent feels himself (herself) as the other identities. ―Turkish‖ coded 1 if the 
respondent feels himself (herself) as Turkish and 0 if the respondent feels himself (herself) as the other identities. 
―Kurdish‖ coded 1 if the respondent feels himself (herself) as Kurdish and 0 if the respondent feels himself 
(herself) as the other identities. 
 
How would you feel/define yourself whether you are European or not? 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid European 36 1,8 1,8 1,8 
European and Turkish 84 4,1 4,3 6,1 
Turkish and European 416 20,3 21,2 27,3 
Turkish 1110 54,2 56,6 83,9 
European and Other 20 1,0 1,0 85,0 
Other and European 43 2,1 2,2 87,1 
Other 174 8,5 8,9 96,0 
Kurdish 25 1,2 1,3 97,3 
Not Classified   2,7 100 
Total 1961 95,8 100,0  
Missing System 86 4,2   
Total 2047 100,0   
Table 5: National Identity 
 
 Other variables, Gender: 1 if the respondent is a man, and zero otherwise. Urban: 1 if parents of the 
respondent live in city center and zero otherwise. Residence: 1 if the respondent lives at least 3 months in any 
EU countries and zero otherwise. 
 
Statistical Findings 
 
 The logistic regression is employed to empirically investigate the determinants of ―support for the EU-
led reforms‖ in the empirical analysis because the dependent variable is dichotomous and the results are 
presented in Table 6. 
In order to test the above proposed hypothesis, a model for each category is developed. In particular, Model I 
provides evidence how and to what extent the partisanship contributes to determine the support for the reform in 
Turkey. Model II deals with the issue whether the political attachment (self-description) is an important factor to 
explain the variation in individual attitudes towards the reform. Model III and IV look at the role of religion and 
the adherence to Islam whether they play any role in this issue respectively. Model V examines whether the 
national identity explains the variation in individual attitudes towards the reform. Model VI includes all the 
variables in the previous models (I-V). Finally Model VII shows the most important factors which contribute to 
explain the determinants of the EU-led reforms in Turkey. 
 Table 1 show that the empirical findings are robust. In particular, Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit 
test indicates that the utilized models in the analysis are well-fit with the data set at hand. In addition, the 
predicted powers of the estimated models are at statistically acceptable level. 
 Model I reveals that whereas the supporters of the JDP and the DSP approve the EU-led reforms, those 
of both the NAP and the FP disapprove this process. Interestingly the coefficient for the RPP, albeit negative, is 
statistically insignificant. These findings show that supporters of the RPP as a mainstream party are skeptical 
about the reforms. 
 Model II indicates that political attachment may be important to explain the variation in individual 
attitudes towards the reforms. While those who describe themselves as Atatürkist are against the reforms, social 
democrats are in favor of the reforms. The self-description of the university students in terms of Turkish 
nationalist, Nationalist (Ulusalcı) and Islamist does not contribute to explain the variations in individual 
attitudes. 
 Model III and IV provide evidence on the attachment to religion and adherence to Islam. The findings 
show that whereas attachment to religion has a statistically significant impact on the individual attitudes toward 
the reform, adherence to Islam does not indicate a significant influence on this issue. 
 Model V examines the effect of national identity on the individual attitudes toward the reforms. The 
results indicate that while those who feel as European are in favor of reforms, those who feel as Turkish are 
against the reforms. 
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 Explanatory Variables Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII 
Partisanship JDP 0,57 (0,18)***     0,62 (0,20)*** 0,73 (0,14)*** 
RPP -0,21 (0,17)     -0,06 (0,20)  
NAP -0,76 (0,19)***     -0,6 (0,21)*** -0,39 (0,15)** 
DSP 0,84 (0,30)***     0,39 (0,34)  
FP -0,85 (0,38)**     -0,53 (0,40)  
None -0,14 (0,17)     -0,08 (0,18)  
Political 
Attachment 
Atatürkist  -0,30 (0,14)**    -0,08 (0,17)  
Turkish Nationalist  -0,05 (0,15)    0,25 (0,18)  
Social Democrat  0,92 (0,18)***    0,75 (0,19)*** 0,78 (0,16)*** 
Nationalist  0,14 (0,18)    0,16 (0,21)  
Islamist  0,14 (0,20)    0,004 (0,23)  
Religious 
Attachment 
Moderately Religious   0,26 (0,11)**   0,23 (0,13)* 0,28 (0,12)** 
Religious   0,36 (0,13)***   0,33 (0,16)** 0,37 (0,14)*** 
Islamic 
Attachment 
Moderately Muslim    0,06 (0,14)  0,13 (0,16)  
Devoted Muslim    0,08 (0,11)  0,02 (0,14)  
National 
identity 
European     0,75 (0,42)* 0,85 (0,47)* 0,74 (0,45)* 
European and Turkish     0,38 (0,27) 0,57 (0,30)*  
Turkish and European     0,02 (0,16) 0,20 (0,19)  
Turkish     -0,60 (0,13)*** -0,36 (0,17)** -0,57 (0,11)*** 
Kurdish     0,69 (0,49) 0,82 (0,59)  
Other 
variables 
Residence 0,36 (0,25) 0,48 (0,26)* 0,37 (0,25) 0,37 (0,24) 0,20 (0,25) 0,51 (0,27)* 0,50 (0,26)* 
Urban 0,09 (0,09) 0,00 (0,09) 0,03 (0,09) 0,04 (0,09) 0,04 (0,09) 0,05 (0,10)  
Gender 0,50 (0,09)*** 0,45 (0,10)*** 0,51 (0,09)*** 0,52 (0,09)*** 0,47 (0,09)*** 0,46 (0,11)*** 0,44 (0,10)*** 
Constant -0,19 (0,16) -0,26 (0,14)* -0,44 (0,12)*** -0,27 (0,09)*** 0,09 (0,15) -0,50 (0,24)** -0,31 (0,13)** 
 N 1851 1787 1877 1881 1866 1712 1728 
 Predicted Correctly (%) 62,4 57,3 56,7 56,8 59,2 63,1 62,3 
 Hosmer Lemeshow Test 8,15 9,64 2,46 1,57 1,59 6,89 2,99 
 Nagelkerke R
2 
0,08 0,06 0,03 0,02 0,07 0,14 0,13 
Note: Values in the parenthesis are the standard error. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively.  
 
Table 6. Results of Logistic Regression on Determinants of the Support for the EU-Led Reforms in Turkey 
  
 
 
 In the econometrical analysis, adding the model may change the significance of the independent variables. 
Considering the multi-facet nature of the reform process, one should take into account these factors. Model VII 
provides an overall picture on this issue as a final model. In particular, statistical findings show that signs and 
significance of the variables for the NAP and Turkish (proxy for the national identity) states that supporters of the 
NAP and those who feel Turkish does not approve the reform process. On the other hand, the variables for the JDP, 
Social Democrat (proxy for the political attachment), both Moderately Religious and Religious (proxies for the 
religious attachment), European (proxy for the national identity), Residence (proxy for social learning) and Gender 
are positive and statistically significant. These findings show that these variables explain the variation in individual 
attitudes toward the reform. In particular, the supporters of the JDP, social democrats, religious people, feeling to be 
European, living in the member countries and finally man approve the EU-led reforms in Turkey.  
 Interestingly while supporters of the RPP disapprove the reforms, the Social Democrats approve the 
reforms. Similarly the coefficients of the DSP (pro-Kurdish party) and Kurdish (as a national identity) are not 
significant in final model (VII). 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is usually argued among the academics and policy makers that the Turkey‘s EU perspective is very 
important because it plays as an external anchor to push further the democratization of the country. On the hand, 
reforms process for the democratization needs to be designed very carefully because the internal support are very 
vital for the sustainability of the reforms in every society. The approval of the reforms are especially very important 
for Turkey as a divided society in terms of secular and conservative, Turks and Kurds, center and periphery. 
Turkey has experiencing a reform process with the support and conditionality of the EU since 2000. The 
reforms for democratization show a cycle process which is very closely associated with the EU‘s perspectives for 
Turkey. In other words, when the EU send a clear signs for the possible full membership, democratization has 
increased in Turkey or vice versa. It is generally argued that reform process has been slowed especially after 2005 
when Turkey got the negotiation for the full membership. One of the reasons might be the lack of support for further 
reform on democratization in Turkey because the recent reform attempts has started to exacerbate the decades-old 
political problems such as the Kurdish issue in the country. 
This paper, therefore, tries to examine the youth support for the EU-led reforms in Turkey. In order to test 
the possible source of the support for the EU-led reforms in Turkey, a novel data set is collected from the university 
students in Turkey and utilized by the logistic regression. The Empirical findings reveal that the partisanship, 
political attachment, religious attachment and national identity contribute to explanation of the variations in 
individual attitudes. In particular, while the supporters of the JDP, Social Democrats, Religious students, those who 
feel as European, living in the member countries and the gender have positive and significant impacts on the 
individual attitudes toward the reform process. On the other hand, supporters of the NAP and those who feel 
themselves as Turkish disapprove the reforms and do not see them as necessary. Interestingly while the social 
democrats approve the reforms, the supporters of the RPP do not support it. This finding is in line with the argument 
which states that Turkish left identified with the Kemalist legacy consider the EU as a threat to Turkey‘s 
fundamentals in terms of the national unity and secularism. Similarly the supporters of pro-Kurdish party (DSP) and 
those who feel themselves as Kurdish does not explain the variations in individual attitudes towards the reforms. 
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Appendix A 
Distribution of the Student in Each University 
University 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid Ġstanbul 216 10,6 10,6 10,6 
Uludağ 107 5,2 5,2 15,8 
Beykent 25 1,2 1,2 17,0 
Kocaeli 97 4,7 4,7 21,7 
Dokuz Eylül 120 5,9 5,9 27,6 
Ege 128 6,3 6,3 33,9 
Ġzmir 27 1,3 1,3 35,2 
Akdeniz 35 1,7 1,7 36,9 
Çukurova 98 4,8 4,8 41,7 
Sütçü Ġmam 33 1,6 1,6 43,3 
Selçuk 182 8,9 8,9 52,2 
Ankara 136 6,6 6,6 58,8 
Erciyes 75 3,7 3,7 62,5 
Afyon Kocatepe 52 2,5 2,5 65,0 
Zonguldak Karaelmas 34 1,7 1,7 66,7 
Ondokuz Mayıs 104 5,1 5,1 71,8 
GaziosmanpaĢa 29 1,4 1,4 73,2 
Karadeniz 126 6,2 6,2 79,3 
Kafkas 30 1,5 1,5 80,8 
Ġnönü 53 2,6 2,6 83,4 
Atatürk 111 5,4 5,4 88,8 
Yüzüncü Yıl 42 2,1 2,1 90,9 
Dicle 66 3,2 3,2 94,1 
Harran 21 1,0 1,0 95,1 
Fırat 64 3,1 3,1 98,2 
Gaziantep 36 1,8 1,8 100,0 
Total 2047 100,0 100,0  
 
